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Social Burden, Social Venture, or Social Responsibility? 
--- A Reflection on CSR in China and CSR Strategy Suggestions for 
Multinational Companies in China 
 
Abstract：Thirty years into its reform and opening, the People’s 
Republic of China (referred to as China) has become aware of 
many international practices, including corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Yet FOR Chinese enterprises, CSR seems 
similar to the heavy social burdens of THE state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). The “cradle-to-grave” welfare system, notorious but 
standard in THE planned economy, played a role in the failure of 
most SOEs to compete with the new, burgeoning private sector. 
Although laws were promulgated to free the SOEs from their “social 
burdens,” the new township enterprises set a different example. 
Some of the latter even profited from their “social ventures.” A 
comparison of the approach of the state sector and that of township 
enterprises sheds light on how MNCs can best tailor their CSR 
strategies to the Chinese situation. 
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I. Introduction: The CSR dilemma in China 
 
As multinational companies (MNCs) expand their global foray, the 
idea of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is flourishing across 
their global supply chain, in part due to pressure from their 
customers. At the end of the last century, CSR was already an 
important issue for all companies, including companies in China. 
Although Chinese interest in CSR is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, the notion of CSR resulted in a nationwide debate. 
CSR obviously has different implications in the context of China, 
especially during the process of economic transition that was 
initiated in December 1978 when China decided to begin its reform 
and opening-up policy at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party. As a result, there have 
been dramatic changes in China over the past three decades, both 
in terms of the external economic situation and the internal 
management of enterprises.  This constitutes the specific 
background to CSR in China.  
The 1978 economic reforms first sought to revitalize the state 
sector. At that time state-owned enterprises (SOEs) accounted for 
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8
77.6 percent of gross industrial output and 85 percent of national 
revenue (Yang and Qu, 2008). But poor efficiency in the state 
sector crippled the growth of the national economy. From 1997 to 
2001 the number of SOEs was cut by 33.6 percent. Even among 
the surviving enterprises, half were still operating at a loss. The 
average ROI of the SOEs was a meagre 3.3 percent, that is, below 
the interest rate (Han and Zhang, 2003).  
To remedy this, parallel to its orthodox public ownership, China 
began to consider pilot programs of diverse types of ownership. 
Township and village enterprises, or TVEs, were the first new type 
of ownership to appear.  Their number soared 15-fold from 1978 to 
1996 (Zou, 2000). It should be remembered that the TVEs emerged 
not because they were desired by Beijing, but because by nature 
they represented a compromise between the face value of 
collective ownership and the competence of the private sector. At 
the time, no one anticipated that their rise would ultimately 
contribute to the collapse of the state firms.  
In 1993 China entered its third phase of reforms to revitalize the 
SOEs. A priority was to free the SOEs of the social burdens of 
companies in socialist countries that represented a  main stumbling 
block to their efficiency and finally led to their failure.  
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9
When the CSR movement first made its debut in China, many 
Chinese enterprises were still feeling the effects of the SOE 
reforms. It was generally believed that due to their social 
obligations, the SOEs had to incur extra costs, eventually resulting 
in huge losses. Many Chinese companies were reluctant to play 
any social role, for fear of a replay of the earlier history.  It was not 
expected that China was destined to be one of the top CSR global 
advocates. 
After three decades of reform and opening, China has 
established a socialist market economy with considerable success. 
But this has come with a price. As the undeniable workshop of the 
world, in tandem with its economic takeoff China became mired in 
“environmental destruction and excessive consumption of 
resources.” The China Economic Research Institute for Territorial 
Resources estimates that 24 out of the 45 types of minerals found 
in China will be depleted by 2010, and only six types will remain in 
supply by 2020 (Sun and Wang, 2005). The World Bank has 
warned that 16 out of top 20 polluted cities in the world are in China 
(Bird, 2006). The past thirty years also saw a widening of the 
income gap, with the Gini coefficient reaching a dangerous level of 
0.45 (Deng, 2008). The promotion of CSR in China will both buffer 
these pressures and sustain the economic growth.  
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10 
But CSR also created a dilemma. In hindsight, the state firms 
feared any social burdens, but looking ahead companies had to 
become more involved with CSR. The situation at China Petroleum 
and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), the first pilot base selected in 
2004 to test-run the government campaign to free key state firms 
from their social burdens, is indicative of this dilemma. Sinopec also 
spearheaded the promotion of CSR in China. In his keynote speech 
at the “Corporate Social Responsibility Forum” in 2004, Wang 
Jiming, vice chairman of Sinopec, unlike most other companies, 
committed Sinopec compliance with CSR practices (Wang, 2005).  
Nevertheless, in sharp contrast to the SOEs’ efforts to relieve 
themselves of their social functions, was the pro-active initiative of 
China's TVEs to engage in social programs. Since the 1990s, the 
SOEs had blamed their incompetence and low efficiency on their 
heavy social burdens, while much had been done to relieve them of 
their commercially nonviable assets. At the turn of the century the 
TVEs voluntarily chose to engage in the construction oft social 
infrastructure and to provide social services. After decades of 
development, the TVEs that had emerged from the socialist market 
economy began investing in community infrastructure programs 
and social activities.  Surprisingly, these efforts were affordable, 
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11 
and even at times profitable, unlike similar efforts in the state 
sector. 
Based on a study and comparison of these two typical Chinese 
phenomena, one a mandate-driven obligation and the other a 
voluntary action, this paper will attempt to explain and clarify this 
distinction for MNCs that intend to deploy CSR strategies in China. 
The paper is organized as follows. The literature review in section 
two reveals that a major corporate concern is stakeholder value 
rather than shareholder value. Instead of taking a reactionary or 
defensive stance by simply donating money, studies show that 
corporations can better leverage their organizational resources to 
solve social problems and also to create commercial value. By 
adopting CSR strategies, corporations can anticipate expect win-
win results from their social endeavours. In section three, we 
explain the different motives and returns of the SOE and TVE social 
functions. Section four provides some suggestions for the 
promotion of CSR by MNCs in China. Section five presents some 
concluding remarks.  
 
II. Literature review: From shareholder to stakeholder 
and from altruistic philanthropy to strategic CSR  
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12 
Global industrialization since the 1920s has contributed to many of 
our concerns today, from the income gap to labour disputes, from 
consumer and occupational hazards, and from environmental 
deterioration to resource depletion, to name but a few. All these 
concerns can be attributed to the continuous expansion of capital 
and the profit-seeking nature of enterprises. As a result, the role of 
enterprises in the development of society became a major topic of 
study.  
In 1923 Oliver Sheldon of the United States put forward the 
concept of “corporate social responsibility”. He held that 
shareholder profits are not an exclusive justification for the 
existence of a company. Apart from shareholder interests, 
companies need also to maximize their social gains, including 
benefits for their employees, consumers, the environment, 
disadvantaged members of the community, and the society at large 
(Sheldon, 1923). In 1984 Freeman went a step further to introduce 
the concept of stakeholder. He defined stakeholder as “any group 
or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p.46), including 
shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, the local 
community, and the entire society. Beginning in the 1990s, 
stakeholder theory has dominated studies of CSR.  U.S. economist 
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13 
Blair (1995) justified the stakeholders’ capacity as a subject of 
interest by pointing out that like shareholders, other stakeholders 
also invest in companies and such investments are as much at 
stake as share capital. For instance, employees invest in firm-
specific human capital, such as skills, capabilities, procedures, and 
personal relations that need to be rewarded, just like the financial 
investments of shareholders. Therefore, non-shareholder 
stakeholders are also residual claimants of the enterprise and are 
entitled both to a role in corporate governance and to part of the 
economic surplus (Blair, 1995; 1996; 1998). This idea provided a 
new perspective to study CSR: companies are socially responsible 
for all stakeholders that have invested firm-specific capital and 
should maximize goods to all the stakeholders.   
With public fears mounting regarding social and environmental 
crises, calls for CSR in the industrial world became increasingly 
vocal by the 1980s, requiring that companies with higher moral 
standards assume some social functions. Toward the mid-1990s 
the CSR movement had shifted its centre of gravity from the 
question of whether companies should be socially responsible to 
the question of how companies can both do well and do good. In 
light of the strategic philanthropy proposed by Porter and Kramer 
(1999), corporate spending on altruistic philanthropy often results in 
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14 
a win-win situation for both givers and takers.  Enterprises not only 
can help solve social problems through altruistic philanthropy, but 
also can profit from the win-win results (Porter and Kramer, 1999; 
2002). Porter and Kramer (2006) suggested that when CSR is 
integrated into corporate strategy, it can be “much more than a 
cost” and also “a source of competitive advantage”, yielding 
financial returns (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). From CSR 
philanthropy to CSR strategy, CSR activities are becoming more 
calibrated to align with mainstream corporate business. Today any 
company that does not have a coherent CSR policy runs the risk of 
ceding its competitive advantages to its rivals. Consequently, the 
study of CSR has shifted to how enterprises can better use their 
CSR strategies to facilitate corporate operations. 
 
 
III. Enterprise social functions in China 
 
1. SOEs providing all social welfare: Social burdens 
 
During the central planning period in China, SOEs were self-
contained units offering all sorts of social services to their 
employees and their families. These social services, from bakeries 
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15 
to nurseries and from schooling to housing, were offered at below- 
cost prices with no consideration of their business implications. The 
consequences of the SOEs playing a dominant role in social 
welfare were chronic and perverse. Coupled with the bloated 
number of employees, many SOEs suffered disastrous results.  
In its early years, the new People’s Republic chose to follow the 
big-government-and-small-society model, with the government 
dictating the availability and allocation of all goods and services 
necessary for the livelihood of its citizens. Due to the acute short 
supply of literally all consumer and capital goods during the infancy 
of the People’s Republic, the government became the ultimate 
supplier of all goods and services through the SOEs.  This was 
possible because in the binary social structure, the farmers 
depended on their own self-subsistence.  The SOEs were 
responsible for the urban areas and the new industrial towns.  The 
latter arose in the mountainous hinterland when China relocated its 
heavy industries as the outside world imposed economic 
embargoes. Such new towns, often emerging from nothing, were 
situated around a single SOE; local infrastructure and amenities 
were built from scratch to meet their needs. Yet, the shortcomings 
of the social infrastructure, the nonexistent social security net, the 
difficult access to social services, and the scarcity of commodity 
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16 
supplies required that the SOEs handle all employee concerns, 
from food to housing, and from life to death. The SOEs set up 
canteens, nurseries, hospitals, schools, and even police offices and 
crematoria to facilitate all aspects of life for their employees.  
Given their heavy social burdens under the planned economy, 
SOEs in China were more of a social rather than a business arm of 
the government.  Balance sheets were of lesser importance 
because the government took all profits and offset all losses, thus 
allowing the SOEs to build up non-performing assets in order to 
serve their social welfare functions. By the 1990s, the liabilities of 
the SOEs had created approximately 20 million jobs, or one-fifth of 
the working population in China. The assets were worth 1 trillion 
yuan (equivalent to about USD120.50 billion1), nearly 40 percent of 
the net assets of the entire state sector (Liu, 1995).  
Taking XiangTan Iron and Steel Group Limited Corporation 
(XTISCO) as an example, it is obvious that these social functions 
created a huge burden on the SOEs. With an annual output of 3.3 
million tons of steel and RMB10.6 billion (equivalent to about 
USD1.28 billion) in gross revenue, in 2004 the company booked 
over 20 million yuan (equivalent to about USD2.41 million) for 
“operating costs” to provide educational subsidies; more than 30 
million yuan (equivalent to about USD3.61 million) for an internal 
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17 
education system; more than 20 million yuan (equivalent to about 
USD2.41 million) for medical care; and more than 40 million yuan 
(equivalent to about USD4.82 million) for levies for municipal 
infrastructure. In total, such “social expenses” amounted to 200 
million yuan (equivalent to about USD24.1 million).  
Historically, the SOEs have been extremely slow to adjust to 
change.  This is also the case with respect to ridding themselves of 
their social functions. In 2005 they were still operating more than 
11,000 primary and high schools and at least 6,100 hospitals. 
Despite low profits, state firms were spending about 45.6 billion 
yuan (equivalent to about USD5.49 billion) annually on social 
services, irrelevant of their portfolios (Zhao, 2005). 
Under the planned economy, these efforts compensated for a 
lack of supplies and benefited staff morale. But under free market 
competition they became too costly to maintain. This explains the 
overwhelming resentment to CSR in the state sector as China 
began revamping the social functions of its SOEs in the 1990s.  
 
2. The TVE approach to social functions：Social ventures 
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18 
As a result of the economic transition, SOEs slowly began to 
discontinue their social functions. At the same time, the 
development of socialist market economy witnessed the 
emergence of many township and private enterprises. As 
collectively owned enterprises, the TVEs represented a mixed form 
of ownership. They were created within rural communities, such as 
townships and villages, to be competitive but also to remain 
collectively owned. Their strong performance soon made them a 
new pillar of the rural economy, absorbing the surplus rural 
labourers. Despite their humble start, the TVEs grew  to account for 
56.47 percent of national industrial output in 1996 and 64.74 
percent in 2005 (Fan, 2008). However, there were still many 
obstacles to their further development, one of which was the lack of 
provision of public services and facilities in the rural areas.   
With their gradual build-up of wealth, beginning in the mid-
1990s some TVEs, unlike the SOEs, began to use their own funds 
to invest in infrastructure and social amenities for their local 
communities. The TVEs not only operated schools for the children 
of their employees, offered cheap housing, and  provided minimum 
wages, but also on occasion built roads, bridges, and even movie 
houses for their host villages, similar to some of the services 
provided by the SOEs in earlier years.  
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19 
One of the best known TVEs is the Hengdian Group in Zhejiang 
province of East China. Since 1993, the Hengdian Group has 
pumped nearly 2 billion yuan (equivalent to about USD240.96 
million) into municipal infrastructure for the local community, 
including the building of dams, bridges, roads, stadiums, movie 
houses, swimming pools, and even gas reservoirs.  It even 
established the first TVE-owned university in the country and the 
largest film studio in Asia.  
    This generation of TVEs is unique in that they invested abundant 
resources in public utilities and on the quality of life for the local 
population. By the end of the 1990s, almost all of the financially 
strong TVEs were involved in the building of the local infrastructure. 
Some TVEs even managed to turn their social undertakings into 
cash cows. The Hengdian Film Studio, for example, built on a 
desolate mountain slope has become a tourist attraction and a 
growth engine for the local economy.  
It is puzzling that given the problems of the SOE sector in 
providing social functions, why did the TVEs voluntarily take on 
such social burdens? Our study finds that in many cases the TVEs 
were acting voluntarily and their efforts paid off. A comparison 
between the two types of enterprises in terms of the provision of 
social services reveals essential differences in their morals and 
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20 
their returns.  It also illustrates how multinationals might deploy 
CSR strategies in China.  
 
3. What makes the difference? 
Both SOEs and TVEs attempted to serve social functions.  
However, the TVEs were more successful than the SOEs.  What 
accounts for this difference and why? 
First, TVEs and SOEs differed in terms of their profit-seeking 
goals.  As the social arm of the government under the centrally 
planned economy, the SOEs were not concerned about their profit 
margins. Their primary mission was to create employment and 
goods, regardless of the cost.  This remained the case until the 
1999 Fourth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee of 
the Communist Party when it was decided that in order to save the 
state sector the SOEs would be relieved of their social functions.  
But from their very beginning the primary goal of the TVEs was 
to reap profits.  Mushrooming in the poor countryside, the TVEs 
soon found the local infrastructure to be a bottleneck to their 
growth.  Therefore, after a certain period of development and 
capital accumulation, they began to reinvest their profits to upgrade 
local hospitals, schools, roads, supply of tap water, drainage, 
irrigation systems, biogas, local power grids, and so on.  This 
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21 
created a win-win situation. The building of these facilities not only 
furthered their own growth but also benefitted the local 
communities. 
Second, given their role in the provision of welfare, the SOEs 
had no choice but to assume their social roles to the extent that 
they were unable to compete in the free market. Under the planned 
economy, the SOEs functioned not as a legal person but as an 
administrative arm of the government. As an all-purpose unit of the 
society, the SOEs had to comply with this mandate since their 
employees and families expected the provision of social services 
regardless of the costs.   
In contrast, the TVEs voluntarily took part in local development. 
They were business-savvy and free to invest as they wished. Over 
time, their efforts became both rewarding and sustainable. Not only 
did TVE efforts supplement the social welfare system, the provision 
of public goods also facilitated their own growth. They were free to 
invest as they liked to safeguard their own efficiency and 
sustainability. 
The third difference between the two was the beneficiary. The 
social efforts of the SOEs only benefitted their staff and families. 
Under the planned economy the redistribution of wealth was not 
achieved by way of social welfare or a social security system but in 
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the form of fringe employment benefits. An employee in the state 
sector had a life-time guarantee to a salary and a package of 
benefits, such as free housing, medical care, education, and a 
pension.  Social security was financed by the company rather than 
the government. Among the few privileged state firms like Sinopec 
with a near-monopoly status in the market, provision of excess 
welfare benefits spoiled their staff, who naturally rebelled when the 
reforms required that they sign term contracts. In the vast majority 
of the state sector, however, there were massive layoffs and 
widespread bankruptcies.  
With their grassroots background, the TVEs focused on the 
local community when they invested in infrastructure 
improvements.  In most cases, together with the small towns and 
nearby areas where they operated, the TVEs boomed.  For 
example, the Hengdian Group invested more than 2 billion yuan 
(equivalent to about USD240.96 million) in infrastructure to 
singlehandedly create facilities for the local population.  More than 
70 percent of the local labour force was employed in the group and 
the Hengdian Film Studio was a catalyst to the development of the 
local service sector. Paradoxically, the TVEs were contributing to 
the society to facilitate their own development, but they also 
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provided even greater benefits than the SOEs through free-riding to 
the society at large  
Apart from these differences, there was also a fundamental 
difference in the stakeholders and the allocation of resources 
between TVEs and SOEs. Before the enterprise reforms in 1993, 
due to property rights ambiguities the SOEs could not distinguish 
between rights and obligations as prescribed by their different 
stakeholders. As a result, they assumed unreasonable social duties 
and misallocated resources among the stakeholders. In effect, the 
SOEs were overly responsible to some stakeholders including their 
employees, the local community, and the local government 
(including the local shareholders), at the cost of the legitimate rights 
of other stakeholders, such as suppliers that risked payments in 
arrears and consumers who suffered from shoddy goods and 
services. Worse still, because of poor efficiency and lack of profits, 
the SOEs violated the fundamental interests of their principal 
stakeholders -- the government and their employees.  In effect, the 
social commitments of the SOEs were doomed to failure because 
they undermined the long-term competitive advantages of the state 
firms. 
In contrast, the stakeholders of the TVEs, which were 
independent economic entities, were clearly identified.  The distinct 
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division of the major stakeholders by management allowed for 
effective investments in social projects. When the balance between 
the benefits of the various stakeholders became a prerequisite for 
the TVEs’ profit maximization, they had every reason to fulfil all 
aspects of their responsibilities, including their social 
responsibilities. When their businesses outgrew the local 
infrastructure, it was natural that they invest in upgrading.  TVE 
corporate success allowed for local reinvestment and CSR 
initiatives that served their long-term strategies.  
 
 
IV. CSR strategy options for multinationals in China 
During the period of economic transition in China, on the one hand 
the majority of enterprises are expected to be released from their 
social functions and to decrease their social expenses.. On the 
other, the rise of the CSR movement requires that enterprises 
integrate their social responsibilities into corporate governance and 
internalize social costs arising from externalities. Although for many 
local firms both needs are compelling, they are also contradictory.  
The past bitter lessons suggest that CSR is nothing more than old 
wine in a new bottle. The perceived costs and burdens related to 
CSR results in many SOEs being adverse to any CSR initiatives. 
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But in the case of the TVEs, there is a correspondence 
between the Western theoretical paradigm of strategic CSR and 
Eastern practice. The TVEs’ successful investment in social 
infrastructure and services proves that social endeavours by 
business entities may also be beneficial social ventures and result 
in a business-society win-win relationship.  Do well by doing good is 
possible if CSR strategies are applied appropriately. A comparison 
between the failure of the SOEs and the success of the TVEs in 
terms of implementing their social functions reveals the essence of 
CSR, and provides suggestions for how CSR strategies by MNCs 
might succeed in  China.  
The authors of this paper suggest that corporate social 
commitments are actually reflected and realized by how the various 
stakeholders are treated since the value creation process of a 
company is achieved based on the strength of the resources 
contributed by all the stakeholders. In essence, CSR represents a 
fair distribution of corporate profits among the stakeholders. In 
reality, corporate social performance is the result of a game among 
the stakeholders. The varying strengths of the different 
stakeholders explain why corporate social performance may be 
inconsistent and be reflected in an unfair distribution of corporate 
resources and profits among the stakeholders. Although the society 
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expects that corporate resources be allocated fairly, enterprises are 
inclined to seek as many benefits as possible from the allocation of 
resources. Strategic CSR is a reciprocal method of social 
investment so that the distribution of corporate profits is both fair 
and optimal among all the stakeholders (Figure 2). Strategic CSR 
will consolidate efforts by the stakeholders in the hopes of long-
term sustainable growth. This is how companies simultaneously 
defend their bottom lines and provide social functions. 
Knowledge of cross-border CSR experiences and local Chinese 
CSR history is helpful to those MNCs mapping strategies to operate 
in China.  
There are two features of CSR performance by MNCs in China. 
First, the special nature of their stakeholders. In a fair reflection of 
their stakeholder priorities, the SOEs and TVEs performed 
differently in terms of their social functions. Likewise, with a wider 
spread of stakeholders from different countries, the stakeholder 
portfolio of the MNCs is much more complex than that of either the 
SOEs or the TVEs (Figure 2). MNCs have investors and customers 
in the home country while they are also dealing with suppliers, 
customers, the local community, and environmental conservation 
efforts in the host country. As suggested above, the essence of 
CSR is the fair distribution of value among the stakeholders. With 
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27 
the cross-border nature of their stakeholders, MNCs find it 
extremely difficult to remain impartial in their redistribution of 
benefits among the stakeholders, hence the barometer of CSR 
performance tends to be distorted. Another feature of CSR 
performance among MNCs lies in the different CSR standards that 
MNCs face in the home country and the host country (Figure 2). In 
most cases, CSR standards are lower in the host country than in 
the home country since in most cases foreign direct investment 
(FDI) involves MNCs from a developed country investing in a less-
developed country. Many MNCs have double standards in gauging 
their social performance, especially when they are promoting CSR 
along their supply chain under pressure from customers in the 
home country rather than out of any other altruistic motive. 
 These two features complicate CSR endeavours by MNCs. 
When operating in the specific CSR environment in China, MNCs 
have various CSR options. The following are some suggestions If 
they intend to integrate their CSR strategy to develop their social 
endeavours into social ventures.  
Many MNCs have been found to lower the CSR bar in China. A 
pollution blacklist from the Institute of Public and Environmental 
Affairs in 2006 cited the China operations of 33 multinational 
companies, including five Fortune 500 companies. MNCs with 
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double standards for CSR claimed that because of the 
shortcomings of local firms, they had to lower their CSR standards 
accordingly. The comparison between the SOEs and the TVEs 
regarding their social commitments reveals that Chinese 
companies are reluctant to undertake social roles due to their 
dismal prior experiences in funding excess social welfare projects.  
But this does not mean that CSR standards are inherently low in 
China. For the same reason, to some extent the Chinese public 
may tolerate the local firms’ lukewarm take on CSR, but may not 
sympathize with the MNCs if they tend to copy and dodge their 
social responsibilities. It is dangerous for MNCs to take it for 
granted that they can safely follow the negative precedents of some 
Chinese companies and “race to the bottom” in terms of  CSR.  
The Chinese public expects that MNCs will provide more CSR.  
One reason for this is that after the economic transition, the SOEs 
left a huge CSR gap that had to be filled and it was appropriate that 
the MNCs take on this role since they are recognized as leaders in 
global CSR.  Another reason for the success of the MNCs has 
much to do with their exploitative use of natural and labour 
resources in China. When their gains far outweigh their 
contributions, when customers must pay the price of CSR in 
exchange for their profits, and when CSR costs and pressures are 
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to local Chinese factories by imposing standards like SA8000, any 
default in CSR on the part of a MNC may trigger public resentment 
against the company. Given the extremely subtle and thorny nature 
of corporate social responsibility in China, it is advisable that MNCs 
be cautious about their CSR performance and carry out CSR as a 
social venture with a broader and longer perspective than their own 
immediate short-term profits. 
The study of the TVEs’ successful management of their social 
efforts reveals that the key to the success of any CSR initiative is to 
refrain from distracting from the fundamental economic roles of the 
enterprise. CSR initiatives constitute part of any corporate strategy; 
therefore social projects should be developed into long-standing, 
self-containing social ventures. As independent economic entities, 
MNCs are free to choose whatever social projects in which they are 
interested so that their CSR strategies stand a better chance of 
success. But before the strategies can be considered successful, 
the MNCs need to tailor their CSR strategies to the needs of China. 
A cross-border CSR strategy without due respect for the contextual 
factors will be largely discounted on both financial and social terms. 
That is especially true in China as people’s memories are still vivid 
about how the ill-fated SOEs provided social services and functions.  
A more recent example is the result of an online poll two weeks 
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after the devastating earthquake that killed hundreds of thousands 
of people in Sichuan province in West China. The poll revealed that 
"the top misanthropic multinationals are the most selfish in terms of 
earthquake donations,”  (Southern Weekend News, 2008). Several 
big-name multinationals were condemned and boycotted by 
Chinese netizens for being slow to donate or for donating too little. 
These MNCs relied on the differences between Eastern and 
Western business ethics as an excuse, but these authors believe 
that MNCs must take the contextual elements into account as they 
chart their CSR strategies. It is true that these companies may have 
had their own reasons to delay donations, but such behaviour at 
critical moments will discount their contributions elsewhere. The 
ways MNCs adopt the challenge of CSR must reflect the particular 
circumstances in which they are operating. By understanding and 
accommodating the CSR situation specific to China, MNCs will not 
necessarily always adopt the most cost-effective strategy, but in the 
long term they will thus avoid a CSR crisis.  
If the earthquake donation scandal reveals how an ill-
considered CSR arrangement may mire an MNC in unexpected 
crises, the China arm of PepsiCo Inc. serves as a case in point to 
illustrate how MNCs can benefit from their CSR strategy. With the 
important decision that Chairman and CEO Indra Nooyi dubbed 
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“Performance with a Purpose”, PepsiCo has undertaken a holistic 
approach toward its objective of making greater contributions to the  
sustainability of the society. The choices of social projects at  
PepsiCo are not arbitrary. They are well managed to leverage 
Pepsi expertise in community work – sanitation of local wells, 
repairing  pumps, and replacing aging storage tanks. The Mother 
Water Cellars Project, a CSR effort initiated by PepsiCo in China to 
promote community access to water has been more effective than 
any TV commercial. An even more laudable social initiative by 
PepsiCo China is the operation of potato farms in the Inner 
Mongolian desert that has not only been profitable for Pepsi but 
also has provided a creative solution to local social problems. By 
building road and power transmission facilities for both the PepsiCo 
Farm and local farmers, planting vegetation for sand control, 
investing in water-saving pivot irrigators, adopting scientific crop 
rotation and cultivation methods to preserve the integrity of the 
soil, and allowing cash crops, PepsiCo’s social efforts greatly 
improved the local eco-environment and the livelihood of the 
indigenous population. PepsiCo’s investment to transform the 
desert manages to save approximately 250 million liters of water 
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annually. Due to a local potato supply of 100,000 tons from the 
Inner Mongolian desert and other farms in China in 2008 alone, 
PepsiCo was able to reap huge savings by sourcing potatoes locally. 
Its scientifically based and economically sound CSR strategies 
successfully bind the benefits of all the stakeholders. In 2007 
PepsiCo, together with two other multinationals, won an annual 
award for being “the most socially responsible multinational in 
China”. In the same year it was named “the most China-loving 
multinational” and given the “outstanding CSR contribution award”.  
Apart from all these honors, Pepsi has now emerged as the leading 
potato-chip producer in China. Strategic CSR tailored to the local 
situation is the main pillar of its success.  
 
V. Conclusions 
Global endorsement of CSR requires that companies do well by 
doing good.  The concept of stakeholders requires that all parties 
with a stake in the company need to be rewarded for its growth. As 
two sides of a coin, to do well and to do good are complementary 
instead of contradictory. Keeping the two in harmony creates a win-
win situation for the long-run survival of the company and prosperity 
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of the stakeholders. As a result, more and more companies are 
turning to CSR strategies for a competitive advantage.  
Yet the economic transition and the massive failures of state-
run firms have complicated the Chinese interpretation of CSR. With 
dismal memories of the ailing SOEs, Chinese enterprises are 
finding it difficult to identify their social roles, both fearing the 
possible costs and burdens associated with such responsibilities 
and being reluctant to become involved. However, the Chinese 
public is adjusting its expectations about the social roles of the 
business community, from their excessive reliance on business in 
the era of the planned economy, to the desperation amid massive 
layoffs during the across-the-board failures of the SOEs. With the 
emergence of the CSR movement, the public still needs to learn 
how to make moderate and reasonable claims on the social roles of 
enterprises. In China today, with the economic transition yet to be 
completed and the country still recovering from the former planned 
economy, there are many missing blocks in the social security net, 
Naturally, CSR is both subtle and thorny for companies both at 
home and abroad.  
Although the state sector historically assumed social functions 
that undermined corporate efficiency, the choice of township and 
village enterprises to invest in local infrastructure both facilitated the 
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growth of their business and contributed to the well-being of the 
local community. The voluntary social initiatives by the TVEs offer a 
new perspective on CSR in China. CSR can be either a social 
burden or even a disaster for enterprises, as in the case of the 
SOEs, or a social venture that brings competitive advantage, as in 
the case of the TVEs. The result is dependent on whether CSR is 
adopted as part of the corporate strategy.  
The authors believe that in essence CSR represents a fair 
allocation of value to all the stakeholders. The shares of certain 
stakeholders cannot become excessive because then the CSR will 
impose burdens and thwart business success, as seen in the case 
of the Chinese SOEs.  But CSR is underperforming when 
enterprises withhold the allocation of resources from any 
stakeholders. A win-win CSR strategy balances the benefits of all of 
the stakeholders and contributes to the sustained growth of the 
company. The examples of the experiences of the TVEs illustrate 
that maximum gains and optimal efficiency of their social projects 
are possible when social efforts are integrated into corporate 
strategies. 
This analysis of CSR history in China and comparison of the 
social roles of SOEs and TVEs and have practical implications for 
MNC operations in China. Given that MNCs face stakeholders from 
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different CSR environments and even countries with different CSR 
standards,  the MNCs have many more variables to consider when 
devising their CSR strategies. Their success in China depends on a 
fine judgement of the local CSR situation. Even though for historical 
reasons local firms in China have not been CSR compliant, MNCs 
should not apply a double standard and allow this to continue. 
Public expectations are high for MNCs to hold up the bar as a long-
term advocate on behalf of CSR and to be exemplary corporate 
citizens. MNCs are advised to take cultural and other CSR-
sensitive issues into account. Support by the Chinese public 
regarding local CSR practices will boost MNC margins and their 
opportunities to develop social endeavours may be transformed 
into long-standing social ventures.  
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Notes: 
1. The exchange rate of the RMB against the USD fluctuated 
slightly between 8.27 and 8.36 from 1996 to 2003. In this article, 
for the sake of convenience we use 8.30. 
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